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Abstract. Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show
that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered accept-
able, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects
of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confi-
dence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence
in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach
to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the
weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is
described and illustrated with a running example.
Keywords: safety cases, confidence arguments, assurance deficits
1 Introduction
A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that
provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for
a given application in a given environment [17]. Although creating a structured
safety argument explicitly explains how the available evidence supports the over-
all claim of acceptable safety, it cannot ensure that the argument itself is ‘good’ or
the evidence is sufficient. A justification for the sufficiency of confidence in safety
arguments is essential. Any gap that prohibits perfect confidence is referred to
as an assurance deficit [11]. The argument about the assurance deficits is given
in a separate argument that is named confidence argument [11]. A confidence
argument demonstrates the existence of sufficient confidence in an element by
showing that the assurance deficits related to this element have been identified
and managed. Showing overall confidence in a safety argument would require
that all elements of the safety argument (such as evidence or contexts) have an
accompanying confidence argument.
In this paper, an approach to systematically identify the assurance deficits
in software safety arguments is proposed. Software safety arguments are safety
arguments that justify, based on evidence, that the software does not contribute
to the system hazards. Following a systematic approach would help in effectively
? This work is supported in part by the NSF CPS grant CNS-1035715 and the NS-
F/FDA Scholar-in-Residence grant CNS-1042829.
2identifying the assurance deficits. To show sufficient confidence in a specific el-
ement in a safety argument, a confidence argument developer first explores all
concerns about the confidence in this element, and then makes claims that these
concerns are addressed. If a claim cannot be supported by convincing evidence,
then a deficit is identified and should be addressed. However, one cannot define
a complete list for all concerns about all elements used in the safety arguments.
In this work, we are taking advantages of a commonality among elements
used in software safety arguments. For example, tool qualification is one of the
concerns for all tool-derived evidence [19]. Addressing a concern like this typi-
cally gives rise to several derived concerns. We collected common concerns for
common elements used in software safety arguments. We call the set of derived
concerns for a specific element characteristics of this element. We structured
this collection of common concerns in what we called the common characteris-
tics map. It is a map from a concern C from the characteristics set, to a set of
derived concerns that need to be argued about to justify sufficient confidence in
C. We also propose a common characteristic mechanism to construct confidence
arguments and identify assurance deficits by instantiating the map to specific
concerns. Any branch of the developed confidence argument not be supported
by evidence indicates an assurance deficit that needs to be addressed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief background on safety
cases. The related work is listed in Section 3. Section 4 explains the basic idea of
the proposed approach. The common characteristics map is presented in Section
5. The common characteristics mechanism is described and illustrated with a
running example in Section 6. The mechanism evaluation is given in Section 7.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Safety Cases
The safety of safety-critical systems is of a great concern. Many such systems are
reviewed and approved or certified by regulatory agencies. For example, medical
devices sold in the United States are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). Some of these medical devices, such as infusion pumps, can-
not be commercially distributed before receiving an approval from the FDA [18].
Which means that manufacturers of such systems are expected not only to
achieve safety but also to convince regulators that it has been achieved [20].
Recently, safety cases have become popular and acceptable ways for communi-
cating ideas and information about the safety-critical systems among the system
stakeholders. The manufactures submit safety cases (to present a clear, compre-
hensive and defensible argument supported by evidence) to the regulators to
show that their products are acceptably safe to operate in the intended con-
text [13]. There are different approaches to structure and present safety cases.
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [13] is one of the description techniques
that have been proven to be useful for constructing safety cases. In this work,
we use the GSN notation in presenting safety cases. There is often commonal-
ity among the structures of arguments used in safety cases. This commonality
3motivates the definition for the concept of argument patterns [13], which is an
approach to support the reuse of arguments among safety cases.
A new approach for creating clear safety cases was introduced in [11]. This
new approach basically separates the major components of the safety cases into
safety argument and confidence argument. A safety argument is limited to give
arguments and evidence that directly target the system safety. For example,
claiming why a specific hazard is sufficiently unlikely to occur and arguing this
claim by testing results as evidence. A confidence argument is given separately
to justify the sufficiency of confidence in this safety argument. Such as ques-
tioning about the confidence in the given testing results (e.g., is that testing
exhaustive?). These two components are given explicitly and separately. They
are interlinked so that justification for having sufficient confidence in individual
aspects of the safety component is clear and readily available but not confused
with the safety component itself. This separation reduces the size of the core
safety argument. Consequently, this new structure is believed to facilitate the
development and reviewing processes for safety cases.
3 Related Work
There exists a widely used method for systematically constructing safety argu-
ments. This method is often referred to as the “Six-Step” method [12]. Although
this method has been used successfully in constructing many safety arguments,
it does not explicitly consider the confidence of the constructed safety argu-
ments [10]. In [16, 19], lists of major factors that should be considered in de-
termining the confidence in arguments are defined. Questions to be considered
when determining the sufficiency of each factor are also given. We were inspired
by this work and focused on one of these factors (i.e., the trustworthiness).
Argument patterns for confidence are given in [11]. Those patterns are defined
based on identifying and managing the assurance deficits to show sufficient con-
fidence in the safety argument. It is necessary to identify the assurance deficits
as completely as practicable. However, it is not quite clear how to do that. This
motivates us to take a step back to reasonably identify the assurance deficits.
Then the list of the recognized assurance deficits can be used in instantiating
the confidence pattern given in [11]. The constructed confidence arguments can
be used in the appraisal process for assurance arguments (e.g., [6, 14]).
There are attempts to quantitatively measure confidence in safety cases such
as [5, 7]. We believe that qualitative reasoning about the confidence existence is
more consistent with the inherited subjectivity in safety cases.
4 Proposed Approach
The best practice for supporting the top-claim of safety arguments (i.e., the
system is acceptably safe) is to show that the identified system hazards are
adequately mitigated. We refer to this type of argument as a contrapositive ar-
gument, since it refutes attempts to show that the system is unsafe. To build
4this argument, one should first determine what could go wrong with this system
(i.e., identify the system hazards). Similarly, the top claim for a confidence ar-
gument is usually that sufficient confidence exists in an element E of the safety
argument. Such a claim can be supported by a contrapositive argument showing
that the identified assurance deficits associated with E are adequately miti-
gated [11]. Extending the analogy, one should first determine the uncertainties
associated with the element (i.e., identify the assurance deficits). Following sys-
tematic approaches helps in effectively identifying system hazards [1]. We believe
that following a systematic approach would also help in effectively identifying
assurance deficits.
The proposed systematic approach to identifying the assurance deficits re-
sults in the construction of positive confidence arguments. A positive argument is
a direct argument that relies on the properties of the actions taken in the devel-
opment (e.g., a well-established development process has been followed, a trusted
tool has been used, etc.). This distinguishes our confidence arguments from the
contrapositive ones discussed above. We stress that the intent of our work is not
to replace contrapositive arguments, but to aid in the identification of deficits
that can then be argued over using a contrapositive argument. However, note
that if no deficits are identified through the construction of a positive argument,
the resulting argument can be used as the requisite confidence argument.
We propose a common characteristics map to provide guidelines for system-
atic construction for positive confidence arguments. Using the map, claims in the
positive confidence arguments can be decomposed until every goal is supported
by positive sufficient evidence. If all branches in the positive confidence argu-
ments are supported by convinced evidence, that means all assurance deficits
are mitigated. For each goal in the resulting confidence arguments that cannot
be solved with sufficient evidence, an assurance deficit is identified and needs to
be addressed. After identifying the assurance deficits in this way, the confidence
pattern [11] can be instantiated to demonstrate that the recognized assurance
deficits are managed.
5 The Common Characteristics Map
As given in [11], the overall confidence in a safety argument requires confidence
arguments to be constructed for all context, all evidence and all inferences used
in the safety argument. There are several factors that influence our confidence in
system safety, such as appropriateness, independence, etc. In this paper, we con-
centrate on one of these factors, namely trustworthiness. Trustworthiness (i.e.,
the likelihood of freedom from errors) is a major factor that must be considered
in determining the assurance of evidence and contexts. According to [11], trust-
worthiness is not a confidence factor for inferences. So the proposed work is used
for context and evidence, but not inferences.
There are commonalities among contexts and evidences used within the soft-
ware safety arguments. For example, software safety arguments are likely to
cite tool-derived evidence. The tool qualification is one of the concerns for any
5tool-derived evidence. Our observation is that elements used in software safety
arguments can be categorized based on their common concerns. The categories
commonly used in software safety arguments are illustrated below:
– Created artifact : e.g., a system model, a fault tree
– Provided artifact : e.g., system requirements, results from technical literature
– Process results: e.g., the formal verification results, the testing results
– The use of a mechanism: e.g., a particular design or verification technique
– The use of a tool : e.g., a specific model-checking or code-generation tool
We note that this list is not complete, but identifies categories that cover a
collection of the more common elements used in software safety arguments. To
show that this list is reasonable, we collected the contexts and evidences used
in the argument patterns given in [2, 3, 10, 13, 19] and found that each of these
elements can be classified as one of the listed categories.
Table 1. Concerns regarding the outcomes of formal verification and testing
Process results Formal verification results Testing results
the used technique the used formal verification
technique
the used testing technique
the used tool the used formal verification
tool
the used testing tool
expertise of the human
involved in the process
expertise of the verification
engineer
expertise of the tester
correctness of the in-
volved artifacts
correctness of the system
properties
correctness of the test cases
the relation among the
involved artifacts
the coverage of the system
requirements
the test coverage
Mapping the confidence concerns. Elements belonging to the same category have
similar concerns about their trustworthiness, which need to be reasoned about in
a confidence argument. Table 1 illustrates this similarity with an example that
compares concerns regarding the outcomes of formal verification and testing, as
examples of evidences cited by software safety arguments. The first column gives
a generalization for the next two columns. For example, the used tool is a gener-
alization that covers the used formal verification tool and the used testing tool.
The formal verification results and the testing results can be categorized as pro-
cess results as shown in the first row. We call this set of concerns characteristics
of the category. Arguments over the characteristics of a category are to support
sufficient confidence in the trustworthiness of elements that belong to this cate-
gory. When we start addressing a particular concern C from the characteristics
set, it may, in turn, give rise to a set of derived trustworthiness concerns, which
correspond to the category exhibited by C. We illustrate the notions of concern,
category of concerns, and characteristics of a category in Figure 1. For example,
suppose we are addressing concern A1 that falls into the category A. Its derived
concerns are B1 and C3, that fall into categories B and C, respectively. More-
over, every concern in A will have derived concerns in B and C. We then say
that B and C are the characteristics of A. Several concrete examples of concerns
and their categories are given below.
6This relationship between categories of concerns based on the notion of char-
acteristics can be captured as a map. We constructed such a map, shown in
Figure 3, that relates each category to its characteristics that need to be ar-
gued about in order to justify sufficient confidence in elements that belong to
this category. Nodes in the map are categories, i.e., sets of concerns with simi-
lar characteristics, where each characteristic is a derived concern, as illustrated
above. Solid arrows connect each node to the nodes that represent categories of
its characteristics. To address a claim about the trustworthiness in a node, we
need to argue over the trustworthiness in all nodes reached by solid arrows from
this node. For example, to show that a process result is trustworthy, argument
about trustworthiness in all aspects of this process should be given, which in-
clude the use of a tool on which the process is based, the artifacts used in the
process, etc. In turn, to address the claim about the trustworthiness in the use
of a tool, we need to argue about the trustworthiness in the tool itself (the tool
category), the person who used this tool (the human factor category), etc.
To show that a created artifact is trustworthy, argument about trustworthi-
ness in its creation process should be given [9]. In addition, we need to argue
that the process of validating the artifact with respect to its requirements is
trustworthy. For example, both the artifact creation process and validation re-
sults exhibit the characteristics of the process results category and, for each, we
should explore the derived concerns of that category. The dotted arrows are used
in the map to demonstrate that the connected two nodes have the same char-
acteristics. Note that we could eliminate dotted arrows altogether by combining
together the nodes connected by dotted arrows. However, we believe that keeping
them separate makes the map easier to follow and helps in map instantiation,
described in Section 6.
Evaluation. The proposed common characteristics map guides to what should
be argued for the confidence in the trustworthiness. We say that the map is con-
sidered reasonable if the concerns collected in the map cover at least all known
concerns. As mentioned in Section 3, some existing work suggests questions to be
asked and things to be considered for the trustworthiness factor. We collected
the concerns and questions given in [11, 16, 19], and made sure that all these
concerns and questions are covered in the common characteristics map. For ex-
ample, concerns listed in [16] for trustworthiness are covered by the common
characteristics map as follows:
– Was the evidence gathered in accordance with any documented standard?
This concern is covered by the category the use of a mechanism.
– Are the evidence-gathering personnel competent? Are they certified to an
appropriate standard? Have they performed the tests before? These concerns
are covered by the expertise of a person category.
– How valid are the assumptions and simplifications that were made? This
concern is covered by applicability of the tool assumptions and limitations
and applicability of the mechanism assumptions and limitations categories.
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86 The Common Characteristics Mechanism
The proposed mechanism starts by creating positive confidence arguments with
the help of the common characteristics map. The main steps of the common
characteristics mechanism are shown in Figure 2. In this section, a description
for each step is given and illustrated with a running example based on a recent
case study. The case study involved constructing a safety case for the imple-
mentation of a Patient Controlled Analgesic (PCA) infusion pump. The PCA
infusion pump is one of those medical devices that are subject to premarket ap-
proval requirements by the FDA [18]. We developed a PCA implementation by
using the model-based approach based on the Generic PCA model [8] provided
by the FDA. The details of our PCA development are given in [15]. Briefly, given
the GPCA Simulink/Stateflow model provided by the FDA, a UPPAAL timed
automata model [4] was constructed using a manual translation process. This
GPCA timed automata model is then used to synthesize the software for our
PCA implementation. In [3], we have presented part of the safety argument for
the resulting implementation. One of the contexts that is referenced in the PCA
safety argument is the GPCA timed automata model. The context of the GPCA
timed automata model is used here as a running example.
As shown in Figure 2, to construct a confidence argument for a given element
of the safety argument using the common characteristics map, we first instantiate
the map starting from the node in the map that corresponds to the category
of this element. For example, the map instance for the GPCA timed automata
model is given in Figure 4. In our example, this model falls in the created artifact
category. We then select the corresponding node from the map and instantiate
it. That is, created artifact node in Figure 3 is instantiated as the GPCA timed
automata model node in Figure 4. We then unroll the map following the solid
edges, and instantiate the reachable nodes: the creation process and validation
results. These two nodes are instantiated to the creation process for the GPCA
timed automata model and validation results nodes, respectively, in Figure 4
in the second layer. The characteristics of these nodes are the same as for the
process results category and, in the third layer in Figure 4, we instantiate those
nodes as well, and continue the instantiation process iteratively.
In the second step, we construct a positive confidence argument from the
instantiated map (e.g., Figure 4). Start from the root node (e.g., the GPCA timed
automata model node in Figure 4). Create the top-level goal claiming sufficient
confidence in the trustworthiness of this element (e.g., goal G:Trustworthiness
in Figure 5). For each node reached from the root node (i.e., layer 2 nodes in
Figure 4), we create a strategy to decompose the top-level goal (e.g., strategies
S:Trustworthy and S:Validation in Figure 5). Each node in layer 3 creates a goal
in the confidence argument, and so on.
We see that the element of the confidence argument created for a node in
the instantiated map depends on its layer. That is, we create goal elements for
nodes in odd layers and strategy elements for nodes in even layers in the map
instance. Actually the same map node can sometimes appear in even layer and
sometimes appear in odd layer. For example, process results node is in layer 1,
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but if it is driven from created artifact then it will be in layer 2. In the first
case, a goal will be created for it claiming the existence of sufficient confidence
in the trustworthiness of the process results. In the second case, a strategy will
be created with an argument by the process (e.g., argument by validation). Solid
shapes and arrows in Figure 5 show part of the developed positive confidence
argument for the GPCA timed automata model.
G:Trustworthiness
Sufficient confidence exists 
in the trustworthiness of the 
GPCA timed automata 
model
S:Validation
Argument by 
Validation
S:Creation
Argument over the 
trustworthiness in the 
GPCA timed automata 
creation process
G:TimedAutomata
Sufficient confidence exists in 
the trustworthiness of using the 
UPPAAL timed automata
S:TAHmmanFactor
Argument over the 
humman factor involved in 
the using of the UPPAAL 
timed automata
G:TADeveloper
Sufficient confidence exists in the 
trustworthiness of the expertise of 
the developer who used the 
UPPAAL timed automata description 
language
G:DevlopmentMechanism
Sufficient confidence exists in the 
trustworthiness of developing the 
GPCA timed automata model from 
the GPCA simulink/stateflow model
G:TAReviewer
Sufficient confidence exists in the 
trustworthiness of the expertise of 
the reviewer who reviewed the using 
of the UPPAAL timed automata 
description language
S:TimedAutomata
Argument over the 
UPPAAL timed 
automata
G:UPPAALTool
Sufficient confidence exists in 
the trustworthiness of using the 
UPPAAL tool
G:Relation
Sufficient confidence exists in the 
trustworthiness of the relation 
between the GPCA simulink/
stateflow model and the GPCA 
timed automata model
G:InvolvedArtifacts
Sufficient confidence exists in 
the trustworthiness of the 
artifacts involved in the GPCA 
timed automata creation 
process
S:Transformation
Argument over the 
transformation steps
S:SemanticDiffs
Argument over the 
semantic differences 
between the simulink/
stateflow and the UPPAAL 
timed automata
G:SemanticDiffs
Sufficient confidence exists in the 
trustworthiness of the handling of 
the semantic differences between 
the simulink/stateflow and the 
UPPAAL timed automata 
Fig. 5. Part of the positive confidence argument for the GPCA timed automata model
The decomposition for the confidence argument nodes continues until ev-
ery claim is supported with evidence. The dotted shapes and arrows in Fig-
ure 5 show the elements that require further decomposition. Decomposition for
G:Relation is required to support the claim about the trustworthiness in the
relation between the GPCA Simulink/Stateflow model and the GPCA timed
automata model. As the GPCA Simulink/Stateflow model was transformed into
the GPCA timed automata model, then this decomposition is given by two
strategies S:Transformation and S:SemanticDiffs. Any claim in the confidence ar-
gument that cannot be supported by evidence identifies an assurance deficit. For
example, although we transformed the GPCA simulink/stateflow model into an
equivalent GPCA timed automata model, we do not have evidence to show this
equivalence at the semantic level. So the claim at G:SemanticDiffs is not sup-
ported and so an assurance deficit is identified here.
For the identified assurance deficits, a contrapositive argument about their
mitigations needs to be constructed using the confidence pattern defined in [11].
In our case, exhaustive conformance testing between the GPCA Simulink/State-
flow model and the GPCA timed automata model may be a reasonable mitiga-
tion. We also have to instantiate the confidence argument for the trustworthiness
of conformance testing from the common characteristics map.
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7 Discussion
Observations. The proposed common characteristics map is not complete and
so it should not be used blindly. The generated confidence arguments may re-
quire additional elements. In particular, generated goals and strategies may need
contexts, assumptions, and/or justifications. For example, a justification node,
stating that the GPCA timed automata model was developed from the GPCA
Simulink/Stateflow model using a careful transformation process [15], should be
connected to goal G:DevelopmentMechanism in Figure 5. Note that if any context
or assumption is added then argument about sufficient confidence in it should
be also considered.
Nodes in the map instance cannot be omitted at will during the confidence
argument construction. Otherwise, confidence in the trustworthiness of the el-
ement under concern is questionable and that identifies a potential assurance
deficit. For example, if tool assumptions are not known, the tool assumptions
node indicates a weakness that should be addressed. However, not every pos-
sible derived concern has to be present. If we decide to omit a branch in the
instantiation, we have to supply appropriate justification.
Limitations. The common characteristics map presented in this paper covers
only the trustworthiness factor. However, similar maps can be constructed for
other factors such as appropriateness. To do this, we need to identity categories
of appropriateness concerns and their characteristics. We leave this as our future
work. The common characteristics mechanism is not an automatic approach, i.e.,
it needs human interactions and decisions (e.g., what nodes can be ignored with
justification and what parts should be added as mentioned above).
While the structure of the argument is directly derived from the map in-
stance, the created goals and strategies still need to be formulated correctly. For
example, goal G:TADeveloper in Figure 5 is derived from the node expertise of
the person in Figure 4. The statement of the goal in G:TADeveloper is formed as
a proposition following the rules given in [12].
8 Conclusions
It is important to identify the assurance deficits and manage them to show suffi-
cient confidence in the safety argument. In this paper, we propose an approach to
systematically construct confidence arguments and identify the assurance deficits
in software safety arguments. Although the proposed mechanism does not guar-
antee to identify all assurance deficits, it helps to identify deficits that may have
been overlooked otherwise. Similarly, following systematic hazard identification
mechanisms does not guarantee that all hazards are identified.
The paper focuses on constructing positive confidence arguments with the
help of a proposed map. However, the map can also be used in the reviewing
process to help regulators identify gaps in submitted confidence arguments.
Our preliminary experience of applying the proposed approach has revealed
that the common characteristics mechanism yields the expected benefits in ex-
ploring important uncovered assurance deficits in software safety arguments.
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